WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`), post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with att
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under objects/ accept state-changing requests via $_REQUEST/$_GET and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (objects/comments_like.json.php), post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (objects/commentAddNew.json.php), and/or delete assets from any category (objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple <img src="…"> tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. Commit 7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c contains a fix.
Why this VPI (explainable, experimental)
VPI breakdown
| Impact | 54.00 |
| Exploitation signal(PoC exists) | ×1.20 |
| VPI | 64.80 |
VPI formula vpi-v1