In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED *connection* response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0). This causes two problems: - The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP pac
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp()
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED connection response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0).
This causes two problems:
The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP packets are rejected with -EPROTO.
rsp->result reads from offset 6 instead of offset 0, returning wrong data when the packet is large enough to pass the check.
Fix by using the correct type. Also pass the already byte-swapped result variable to BT_DBG instead of the raw __le16 field.
Why this VPI (explainable, experimental)
VPI breakdown
| Impact | 71.00 |
| Exploitation signal(No additional exploitation signal) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 71.00 |
VPI formula vpi-v1