OpenAM Reflected XSS in the OAuth2/OIDC `wap` consent page
The OAuth2/OIDC consent page rendered for display=wap authorize requests reflected several request-derived values into the HTML response without escaping. An attacker who induces a user with an active OpenAM session to follow a crafted authorize link can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the OpenAM origin.
This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-44203; that fix did not cover this code path.
Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenAM origin in the victim's authenticated context — enabling session/cookie theft, CSRF-token exfiltration, and actions on behalf of the victim, up to administrative takeover if the victim is an administrator. Reachable on any deployment with at least one registered OAuth2 client; no attacker-controlled client and no special configuration required.
display=wap authorize links as untrusted.Why this VPI (explainable, experimental)
VPI breakdown
| Impact | 61.00 |
| Exploitation signal(No additional exploitation signal) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 61.00 |
VPI formula vpi-v1