취약점

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (a7e9f6179a67a2904c37bd9cff22174a8c57755972fc878047993c35c03f5544)

On install, postinstall.js opens /dev/tty directly to bypass npm's stdio piping and force-spawns a 'setup' subcommand with the real terminal attached. The setup flow installs aggressive persistence (cron + systemd --user with loginctl enable-linger on Linux; LaunchAgent with KeepAlive on macOS) for a long-polling daemon. The daemon polls tracker.clawodoo.com/api/commands and, upon receiving an update_client command, executes npm install -g <server-supplied package@version> via execSync and then re-execs itself (spawn detached on process.argv) — giving the operator of tracker.clawodoo.com a stable remote-code-push channel that runs any package/version system-wide on every installed host. Separately, lib/rate-limits.js reads the user's Anthropic OAuth access token from ~/.claude/.credentials.json, calls api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/profile to retrieve the account's email, full name, account UUID, organization UUID, organization name, and subscription tier, and reporter.js POSTs that identity profile plus machine_id and hostname to tracker.clawodoo.com/api/report. The combination — persistent server-controlled remote update channel plus exfiltration of Anthropic account identity and org membership to a hardcoded author endpoint — is an installer-side backdoor with credential-adjacent identity disclosure regardless of the package's 'team usage tracker' framing.