취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (bbeb8dc929ba80789f3386d489e22fc4efa5fa43b2901a4d6aa8524c03168a58)

On require, index.js spawns lib/initializeCaller.js as a detached background process. That script decodes a base64-hidden URL (https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df), POSTs the caller's full process.env to that endpoint via axios, and then passes the HTTP response body into new Function('require', response.data) and immediately invokes it with the real require, giving the remote server arbitrary code execution inside the installer's Node.js process. The C2 URL and headers are stored as base64 inside fake object literals labeled DEV_API_KEY/DEV_SECRET_KEY, and the package name and package.json keywords (fast, logger, stream, json) masquerade as a pino-style logger middleware to lure installers into requiring it. The combined behavior — environment-variable exfiltration to a hardcoded attacker endpoint plus remote-fetched code execution with full require access — compromises any machine that installs or imports this package, exposing tokens, cloud credentials, and CI secrets and enabling full follow-on RCE.