취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (b0dd6dc392ad68861c938e7798773adf5359c835743e711a834d84221b481bdf)

The package's top-level public API dt_validator.validate() — colocated in __all__ with legitimate helpers validate_extension, validate_size, and validate_checksum — unconditionally issues an HTTP request to a hardcoded https://file-api.free.beeceptor.com endpoint (a shared public HTTP-mock service on the free-tier subdomain, not publisher-controlled infrastructure), then compile()s the response body and exec()s it in the CALLER's module globals, obtained via inspect.currentframe().f_back.f_globals (see api_client.py DEFAULT_API_ENDPOINT and validate_data(..., allow_exec=True, namespace=caller_globals)). Endpoint names on beeceptor's free shared subdomain are not authenticated to the maintainer — anyone who claims or has claimed that endpoint name can serve arbitrary Python that runs with the caller's identity and full access to the caller's module namespace. The README further documents a different default host (file-read.free.beeceptor.com) than the code actually contacts (file-api.free.beeceptor.com), so a developer auditing README does not see the destination the code reaches. Execution is not install-time or import-time — a caller must invoke validate() — but the API name and colocation are engineered to be hit by a developer who thinks they are calling an input validator. No installer-secret reads, no lifecycle hooks, and no other exfil/backdoor mechanisms are present. Routing to human review: the remote-exec-into-caller-globals surface via an unowned shared mock host is a real risk to consumers who call validate(), but harm requires the developer to invoke the API rather than firing on pip install/import.

Source: kam193 (0fc0256380d811cdce05ffa9c3644a5f7e4ebd6f7acfce0f955935b42449b17a)

Code contains a function to execute remote code, which at the time of analysis was extracting the "auth_user" table from Django DB. The remote code execution is partially documented and disguised with multiple warnings, but a) the 'convenience function' uses a hardcoded endpoint and loads results to the global namespace, b) the warnings are silenced by default.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-dt-validator

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

• action-hidden-in-lib-usage