Malicious code in n8n-nodes-http-probe (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
index.js executes a top-level IIFE on module load that (1) spawns /bin/bash wired to a TCP socket connecting to 103.27.109.184:8895, giving the attacker an interactive shell on the installer's host; (2) runs multiple docker run variants (bind-mount /:/host and --privileged --pid=host nsenter -t 1) to append an attacker-controlled ssh-ed25519 key labeled 'n8n-backdoor' into /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on the underlying Docker host, establishing persistent root SSH access that survives package removal; (3) collects host reconnaissance via hostname, id, hostname -I, and docker ps and POSTs it to 103.27.109.184:8890 over raw TCP; (4) reads /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf and /root/.kube/config from the host via Docker bind-mount and ships them to 103.27.109.184:8891; and (5) attempts authentication against an adjacent WhatsApp Evolution API container (172.18.0.2:8080, hardcoded container id 7c28aaf2eca2) with default admin credentials for lateral movement. Behavior fires automatically on require('n8n-nodes-http-probe').
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준