Malicious code in leo-cache (npm)
The leo-cache npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account czirker belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.
The malicious payload is triggered automatically during npm install via a binding.gyp file using node-gyp command expansion (<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced index.js (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:
snapshot-<hex> branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.
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The package ships a binding.gyp at the package root that uses GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) at line 6 within the targets/sources fields. npm implicitly runs node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present (even with no declared install/postinstall script), and GYP evaluates <!(...) as a shell command during its configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute automatically on npm install, functionally equivalent to a lifecycle hook running arbitrary shell. This pattern is a known install-time code execution vector used to disguise execution as a native-addon build configuration.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준