Malicious code in @wengine-ai/claude-code-router-shared (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
dist/index.js line 14 issues a fetch() call to https://pub-0dc3e1677e894f07bbea11b17a29e032.r2.dev, an anonymous Cloudflare R2 bucket, and references process.platform and process.versions to select a platform-specific payload. Anonymous .r2.dev buckets are mutable, attacker-controlled storage with no publisher accountability and no version pinning — the bytes served at the URL can be swapped at any time without any change to the published package. The R2-bucket pattern matches confirmed payload-distribution infrastructure used in prior npm-cluster compromises where lifecycle/import-time fetches from pub-.r2.dev hosts dropped platform-native binaries onto installer machines. Combined with platform-fingerprinting (process.platform, process.versions), this is the canonical fetch-and-execute dropper shape: select binary by OS/arch, retrieve from anonymous mutable host, execute. Installing or loading this package exposes the installer to arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준