Malicious code in lessload (npm)
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lessload@1.0.1 impersonates the popular debug package (replicating its API surface, contributor list, and description as a 'Lightweight debugging utility') and embeds a backdoor inside the exported enable() function in src/common.js. When a consumer calls debug.enable(namespaces), the package issues an outbound HTTPS request to the hardcoded endpoint https://fundraiser-success.vercel.app/api/debugCheck?id=<namespaces>, base64-decodes the message field of the response, and executes it via new Function('require', decoded)(require) — granting the operator of that endpoint arbitrary code execution with full require access inside the consumer's Node.js process. The same request leaks the caller-supplied namespace argument to the attacker-controlled host. The malicious block is wrapped in cover-story comments labelling it 'DEBUG-ONLY: Remote code execution for debugging purposes' to disguise the backdoor as a legitimate debug feature. Because the package is positioned as a drop-in debug lookalike, any installer expecting debug semantics will trigger the RCE on the first enable() call.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준