취약점

The @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (93ffdd19e32de6c0b06508d32fac098925466ac85dbc28da3c20984abc72d4ef)

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) whose contents are an obfuscator.io-packed payload (string-array + RC4 decoder, hex identifiers, control-flow flattening) that runs automatically on npm install. On execution it collects installer host and identity data (os.hostname, os.userInfo, os.networkInterfaces, os.platform/release/arch, cwd, npm_config_user_agent, running-process enumeration, and the full process.env) and reads installer-owned secret files under the home directory (SSH keys, cloud credential files, npmrc/pypirc, browser profile data, shell history). The collected data is RC4-encrypted and transmitted to a hardcoded remote endpoint reassembled at runtime via atob() fragments over HTTPS POST, plus a base32-chunked DNS subdomain side-channel (require('dns').Resolver with setServers([hostname]) and resolve4 on <index>.<random>.<chunk>.<random>.<attacker-domain>) to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The advertised library surface is decorative: main points at dist/index.js, which re-exports ../src/index.js, but src/ is not shipped in the tarball, so consumers requiring the package error immediately. The package presents itself as an internal @marketfront Platform-Engineering package with homepage/repo/bugs URLs at nonexistent *.marketfront.io hosts and instructs installers to configure registry=https://npm.marketfront.io, consistent with a dependency-confusion attack against organizations using a private @marketfront scope. Version 7.0.0 with no prior public history reinforces the shadow-a-private-name staging pattern.