취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (0921a05dced95d8d0bb5d99de362f67e4e67832874fb0b4391629f5dfe6e926d)

The published tarball's chat components (AiChat/Chat/useSSE.js and AiChat/ChatInput.vue2.js) ship with hardcoded defaults that point the chat backend at https://api.apiyi.com/v1/chat/completions (a third-party OpenAI-compatible proxy aggregator) using an Authorization: Bearer sk-fe9MtO... header that is also hardcoded in the source. The package is advertised as a Vue 3 AI chat component library, and the README does not disclose this default destination or that an author-supplied key is being used. Any developer who drops the components into an application without overriding moduleInfo.config.action and the headers() function will cause their downstream end users' chat prompts to be transmitted to api.apiyi.com under the author's account. This is the silent-relay shape: a hardcoded third-party destination chosen by the author, embedded in the package's advertised public API, that exfiltrates caller-supplied data on normal use. The shipped bearer token additionally enables anyone who installs the package to consume the author's apiyi.com quota (author self-harm), but the installer-side concern is the silent relay of user prompt data. A separate hardcoded RFC1918 endpoint and auth token in TouchAgent.vue2.js (http://10.19.93.128:30015/..., authToken: c09f1251-...) is unreachable from installers and is a quality/info-leak issue rather than an active threat.