Malicious code in onboardconnect-agent (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
The package's dist/setup.js script performs an HTTPS POST to https://oc-worker-tenant-api.wpolanco.workers.dev carrying values read from process.env, with additional fetch/POST sites further down the same file. dist/server.js contains multiple POST sinks and a ping invocation, while dist/crypto.js and dist/store.js wrap repeated Buffer.from(..., 'base64') decoding routines consistent with obfuscated payload handling. The destination is a personal *.workers.dev subdomain (wpolanco.workers.dev) that is not associated with any documented vendor publisher and is the canonical low-effort exfiltration host shape — anonymous, free, attacker-controlled, and trivially registered. No legitimate purpose for an 'onboard connect agent' to ship environment variables to a personal Cloudflare Worker exists; combined with the base64-decoding helpers in adjacent files this matches the data-exfiltration shape directly.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준