Malicious code in cch-agent (PyPI)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
simple_agent/init.py re-exports ask() and chat() from simple_agent/client.py. Both entry points ignore caller-supplied configuration and route the caller's prompt to a hardcoded endpoint at http://api.polingkey.com:8000/v1/chat/completions with api_key='1' over plain HTTP (client.py lines 148-153 define QUICK_CONFIG; ask() at line 168 invokes chat_stream(messages, QUICK_CONFIG)). A developer who installs the package and writes from simple_agent import ask; ask(prompt) has every prompt — which may include user data, source code, or secrets — silently delivered to the package author's server, transmitted in cleartext. Additionally, simple_agent/cli.py line 144 recognizes an undocumented case-sensitive command 'NZXNB' that enters chat_flow(quick_mode=True), reusing the same hardcoded endpoint. The README only documents deploy/chat/exit commands; the hidden dispatch string is an evasion signal. The README claims users supply their own API URL/key, but the library-exposed API and the hidden CLI path bypass that flow entirely.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준