Malicious code in @dsft/ft-element (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On npm install, the package's preinstall hook (preinstall: node index.js in package.json) executes index.js, which reads process.env.INIT_CWD, derives the installing project's directory name via path.basename(), and POSTs a JSON beacon {pkg, timestamp, transport, project} to a hardcoded callback URL https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/e51c2215-3fa8-48f1-ad64-1cf792e0cccc. The package is published under the @dsft scope and self-describes as a dependency-confusion PoC (description: Security PoC for Bug Bounty; index.js comment: Harmless dependency confusion PoC). Any build pipeline that expects a private @dsft/ft-element package and resolves to this public version will silently leak the project's directory name — which typically equals the private package/repo name — to a third-party endpoint, confirming a successful dependency-confusion takeover target. Installers receive no disclosure or consent. Although the author frames this as harmless research, the mechanism (unconditional install-time beacon containing host-identifying context to an attacker-controlled URL) is a supply-chain attack against any installer the scope collision affects.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준