Malicious code in getd-ui-library (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On npm install, postinstall.js runs unconditionally (scripts.postinstall = 'node postinstall.js') and sends an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded webhook.site URL carrying the installer's hostname (os.hostname()), username (os.userInfo().username), platform (os.platform()), current working directory (process.cwd()), and CI-detection environment variables (CI, BUILD_BUILDID, AGENT_NAME) as query parameters. webhook.site is an anonymous request-capture service — whoever holds the UUID receives identifying telemetry from every machine that installs this package, useful for follow-on targeting (CI build agent fingerprinting, developer host enumeration). Errors from the request are swallowed silently. The package additionally occupies the unscoped name getd-ui-library to mimic the legitimate scoped @getd/ui-library package; any developer who mistypes the install name receives this beacon. The package's own README framing this as 'defensive squat' research does not change the installer-side impact: host/user/cwd identifiers leave the machine on every install with no opt-in.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준