취약점

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer ddjidd5640 (1623682356@qq.com) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The postinstall hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json (hardcoded fallback: https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233). At runtime, scanner.js performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in index.js are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., verify_key_format: “Private key or key material to validate”).

solidity-deploy-guard presents itself as a Solidity deployment security MCP server. No clean prior version is known; version 0.4.4 carries the malicious postinstall hook and scanner.js payload from first publication.