취약점

Note: This report is updated by a verification record

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/shared at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (becb5aca9f28fbd99a4f45ed70489960879ba81cfbd2071648c98cf5e867d8f9)

On install, the package's postinstall hook (node canary.js postinstall per package.json) issues an unconditional HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path /dc with query params containing the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. No environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted; the payload is limited to package metadata. The README describes this as an authorized dependency-confusion canary against the @demica scope. The fact-of-install ping is otherwise benign, but it performs unconsented outbound network at install time, the destination is a bare IP over cleartext HTTP with no authentication or pinning, and the same postinstall hook is a position from which a future republish could deliver arbitrary payloads. Routing to human review so the @demica organization can confirm the canary is theirs and that the destination IP is operator-controlled.