PraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard
recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guardPraisonAI's installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases,
the recipe command is registered in the Typer app and
praisonai recipe serve dispatches to the deprecated Typer command in
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py.
That Typer command can start the Recipe HTTP server on a non-localhost interface with no authentication:
praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin
It prints a deprecation warning, then launches the server with:
{
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"config": {
"cors_origins": "*",
"enable_admin": true
}
}
Because config.auth is absent, create_app() does not attach the API-key or
JWT middleware. Unauthenticated requests can then reach the recipe API and, when
enabled, /admin/reload.
This is an incomplete hardening / sibling-callsite issue. The legacy feature
handler in src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py rejects the same
non-localhost/no-auth combination, and current create_auth_middleware() now
fails closed if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret. The installed
Typer command bypasses both expectations by never requiring or setting auth.
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/__main__.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/app.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.pyConfirmed affected:
v4.6.58 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
v4.6.57 e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528
v4.6.56 d3c4a2afadfbf3a3e172e460e607ba4efad263a6
v4.6.34 e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133
v4.6.33 dfbb8d78ec7e8dc7118bc722ab1b2524bc98ddab
v4.6.10 4b1b17b963cbd0625e41394a30168c95b26429b2
v4.5.128 b4e3a8a84ade44ac3dd9102b792cdb4311a95937
v4.5.112 bfe3d94bad6db92fc2927c2e3c081ae8303e209e
Suggested affected range: praisonai >= 4.5.112, <= 4.6.58.
The lower bound is conservative and based on sampled tags. Maintainers should confirm the exact introduction point before publishing a final range.
The installed entrypoint routes registered Typer commands before falling back to the legacy dispatcher:
if first_cmd in _get_typer_commands():
_run_typer(argv)
else:
_run_legacy(argv)
cli/app.py registers commands.recipe as the recipe Typer command:
from .commands.recipe import app as recipe_app
...
app.add_typer(recipe_app, name="recipe", help="Recipe management")
The deprecated Typer recipe serve implementation accepts a remote host,
defaults CORS to *, and only enables authentication when --api-key is
explicitly provided:
host: str = typer.Option("127.0.0.1", "--host", "-h", ...)
api_key: str = typer.Option(None, "--api-key", ...)
cors: str = typer.Option("*", "--cors", ...)
admin: bool = typer.Option(False, "--admin", ...)
...
serve_config = {}
...
if api_key:
serve_config["api_key"] = api_key
serve_config["auth"] = "api-key"
if cors:
serve_config["cors_origins"] = cors
if admin:
serve_config["enable_admin"] = True
...
serve(host=host, port=port, reload=reload, config=serve_config, workers=workers)
There is no equivalent to the hardened non-localhost guard in the legacy feature handler:
if host != "127.0.0.1" and host != "localhost" and auth == "none":
self._print_error("Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt")
return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED
The Recipe server only installs auth middleware when config["auth"] is set:
auth_type = config.get("auth")
if auth_type and auth_type != "none":
auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(...)
if auth_middleware:
middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))
On current v4.6.58, the selected-auth paths fail closed correctly:
auth=api-key with no key returns 503.auth=api-key with a key but no request header returns 401.The vulnerable Typer path does not select auth at all.
Run from the harness checkout:
uv run \
--with starlette --with httpx --with typer --with rich --with pyyaml \
--with sse-starlette --with click --with python-dotenv \
python submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-016-recipe-serve-typer-auth-bypass/poc/pov_prai_cand_016_recipe_serve_typer_auth_bypass.py \
--repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
--label v4.6.58
The PoV does not bind a socket. It monkey-patches the recipe server launcher,
invokes the real praisonai.__main__.main() entrypoint with
recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin, captures the launch config, and then
uses Starlette's in-process test client to exercise the resulting app.
Observed v4.6.58 result:
{
"candidate": "PRAI-CAND-016",
"entrypoint_exit_code": 0,
"typer_recipe_command_registered": true,
"captured_launch": {
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8765,
"config": {
"cors_origins": "*",
"enable_admin": true
}
},
"bypass": {
"admin_reload": {
"path": "/admin/reload",
"status": 200
},
"openapi": {
"path": "/openapi.json",
"status": 200
}
},
"controls": {
"auth_api_key_no_secret": {
"admin_reload": {
"status": 503
}
},
"auth_api_key_no_header": {
"admin_reload": {
"status": 401
}
}
},
"feature_handler_nonlocalhost_noauth_exit": 4,
"auth_fail_closed_current_control": true,
"ok": true
}
Stored evidence:
evidence/current-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/version-sweep.tsvThis is not only a disagreement about whether operators should configure auth.
PraisonAI's current security documentation says recent hardening changed API
servers so anonymous requests return 401 and servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by
default. Recipe server docs say auth: api-key should be used for production,
admin endpoints require auth, and public servers should not run without
authentication.
The implementation also shows the intended boundary:
create_auth_middleware() now returns 503 if API-key/JWT auth is selected
without a secret.RecipeHandler.cmd_serve() refuses non-localhost binding when auth is
none.praisonai recipe
to that Typer command before the legacy handler can enforce the guard.The official local HTTP sidecar docs describe the sidecar as communicating over localhost and "no external network required", but the Docker example still uses:
CMD ["praisonai", "recipe", "serve", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8765"]
That command exposes the Typer path above and does not enable auth, even if
PRAISONAI_API_KEY is present in the environment, because this path only sets
auth when --api-key is passed or a config file sets auth.
If an operator follows the vulnerable command path on a reachable interface, any network caller that can reach the Recipe HTTP server can access recipe runner endpoints without credentials.
Affected endpoints include:
GET /v1/recipesPOST /v1/recipes/runPOST /v1/recipes/streamPOST /v1/recipes/validatePOST /admin/reload when admin endpoints are enabledThe exact impact depends on configured recipes and deployment context. At a minimum, an attacker can enumerate recipes and trigger recipe validation or execution flows intended for local or authenticated callers. In deployments with powerful recipes, tool-enabled recipes, or admin endpoints, this can cause unauthorized workflow execution, model/API spend, state changes, or recipe registry reload operations.
This report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default.
Prefer one canonical Recipe server CLI path and enforce the same preflight for every wrapper.
Recommended changes:
praisonai recipe serve command,
or make it delegate to the hardened RecipeHandler.cmd_serve() code path.cli/commands/recipe.py.PRAISONAI_API_KEY as a secret only when auth=api-key is selected;
do not rely on the env var's presence alone unless the command also enables
auth explicitly.--cors default from * to no CORS or localhost origins.praisonai.__main__.main()
entrypoint, not only the legacy feature handler:
praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 fails before launch unless auth is
selected and configured;praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin cannot expose
/admin/reload without auth;503;401.왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 82.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 82.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준