Malicious code in chai-as-byte (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On require of the package's main entry, index.js detaches a child process that runs lib/initializeCaller.js. That script posts the caller's entire process.env to a base64-obfuscated URL (decoded destination: https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df) using axios, then passes the response body to new Function('require', response.data) and invokes it with the module require — giving the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution on the installer's host with full module access. The package name mimics the chai-as-* family while its metadata advertises a JSON logger, and neither role is implemented in the shipped code; the main entry silently spawns the exfil/RCE task instead of exposing any library API. The bulk-environment upload captures CI secrets, cloud tokens, and API keys that live in process.env in typical build environments.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준