취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (6b1e32b74c68582be18feb35e92f095c753491a1c6b9e62b52eb0a1dbe300d69)

The package ships a CLI binary (dist/exocore) that hardcodes process.env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to https://exocoreai-exocore-gateway.hf.space/v1 and process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to 'exocode-key' as defaults when those environment variables are unset. When a user runs the exocode CLI without explicitly configuring apis.json, all Anthropic-bound API traffic — including the user's coding prompts and any caller-supplied content — is silently routed through the author-operated HuggingFace Space. The bundle header includes a '0.0.0-leaked' marker, consistent with a repackaged/pirated Anthropic Claude Code fork rather than an independent client. This is the silent-relay shape: the advertised CLI's normal use causes caller-supplied data to flow to an author-controlled destination by default. Additionally, the postinstall script (install.cjs) performs two aggressive actions: (1) execSync('npm cache clean --force') followed by rm -rf against the installer's ~/.npm/_cacache directory, destroying cached artifacts for every other package on the machine; (2) silently npm install -g bun with a curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash fallback. The Bun install is purpose-aligned (the CLI shebang is #!/usr/bin/env bun) and uses the publisher's own domain, but the cache wipe affects unrelated packages and is not normal install behavior.