취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (4db5b16c4a10377beb73341758a26afed16a44d377dc03009601f610dd289b22)

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, which iterates a hardcoded list of ~90 unrelated package names (imillegal1..N, ishowfeet*, nottuff*, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*) and runs npm publish --silent for each, republishing the same payload under each name. The payload is a browser SPA (Mercury/Scramjet-style web proxy with a Lucide UI) plus heavily obfuscated JS bundles in assets/*.js. package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall hooks and no bin; the declared main is a browser service worker (sw.js) that calls importScripts/self and throws immediately under Node, so npm install abuden21 and require('abuden21') perform no code execution against the installer. The bundled index.html (and a duplicate inside logo.svg) registers click/keydown/touchstart handlers that open https://abdct.com/ as a popunder on first user gesture when the SPA is served in a browser — monetisation of the web-proxy front-end, not installer-side harm. No credential reads, no outbound exfiltration on install, no RCE, no dropper. The behaviour of concern is namespace pollution: the same tarball is mass-published across many unrelated names to squat the npm namespace and ride traffic / typo'd installs. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse handling; this is not a direct supply-chain attack on installers but is an abuse pattern the registry/feed maintainers may want to act on.

Source: ghsa-malware (467b755aecd2b9bed5b5771c6fd59024d00f1d5c5aff97e7d70f0aaab2d0319e)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.