Malicious code in chain-guardian (npm)
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chain-guardian presents itself as a mocha gas reporter (typosquatting eth-gas-reporter) but its main entry index.js contains an always-true gate (var opt = 1; if (!opt) {... } else {... }) that forces construction of the reporter to invoke utils.connectNet. connectNet resolves lib/syncResolve.js and spawns it via spawn('node', [u_src], { detached: true, stdio: ['ignore'] }) followed by progs.unref(), so the child continues running after mocha exits with its output suppressed. lib/syncResolve.js fetches http://check-server-state.vercel.app/server/v2 over plaintext HTTP and, on a 404 response whose body carries a token field, passes that field to new Function('require', error.response.data.token) and invokes the resulting function with the real require, giving the remote host arbitrary code execution in the developer or CI Node process. A duplicate benign Gas reporter function is defined but never exported, serving as cover for the dropper path.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준