취약점

The @marketfront/devtoolsloader package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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Source: amazon-inspector (d449d3db7f73a80417996b67687dca9330bf5d0591233c639416a4f2e2b7eb22)

The package ships a heavily obfuscated postinstall script (scripts/postinstall.js, ~161 KB, obfuscator.io RC4 string-array with control-flow flattening) invoked from package.json ("postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js"). At npm install time the script collects host identifiers (os.userInfo(), os.networkInterfaces(), hostname), enumerates process.env against embedded char-code-encoded arrays of credential-shaped variable names (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, and additional token/secret-shaped keys), and reads installer-side dotfiles (shell history / rc files) via decoded absolute paths. The payload is XOR-encrypted and transmitted via https.request POST and DNS queries to a destination decoded from the obfuscated string array. Execution is gated on sandbox-evasion checks (process.argv[0]/argv[1] inspection, NODE_OPTIONS blocklist tokens, Date.now spin-loop timing) so the payload only fires on real developer machines. The package advertises a fictitious internal corporate infrastructure (@marketfront scope, github.marketfront.io, npm.marketfront.io) and ships no functional library — dist/index.js re-exports../src/index.js which is absent from the tarball — consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting developers expecting an internal @marketfront/* package. Installing this package on a developer or CI machine results in exfiltration of environment variables (including any credentials present in env), host identity, and shell history/config file contents to an attacker-controlled endpoint.