취약점

The salesforce-vscode-slds package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System VS Code tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672.

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Source: amazon-inspector (0917b0d6d85d4b6d865e8d7febb4b84fe2ef0d526d18c1d754706f3213b2a485)

The package name mimics Salesforce's SLDS/VS Code ecosystem but ships no SLDS functionality; it is a generic Sentry uploader authored by an unrelated party. The preinstall script (npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js) runs on npm install: examples/verify.js initializes Sentry with a hardcoded DSN (https://d4616e08f531447bd415e91fd21940a6@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672) and sendDefaultPii: true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace, attaches it as ip_address on the Sentry user scope, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes to the hardcoded endpoint — so installing the package emits the developer's egress IP and process metadata to a Sentry project the installer does not own. The package main (src/index.js) also hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN, so any consumer calling init()/check/wrap/reportError without an explicit dsn or SENTRY_DSN silently routes their runtime errors and default PII to the same author-controlled project. The typosquat name is the lure for developers expecting a Salesforce package.