취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (542fdb1c23b52adda0ed5164b65c9768aef7a5edd45473f9cd3ceab3065b1bb3)

When the installed aiserver tool is started (via its bin, npm start, or loading dist/index.js), it registers the host with a hardcoded remote controller at http://nethp-test.jd.com and begins polling http://nethp-test.jd.com/rest/execution-queue/tasks/next over plaintext HTTP. The response body may contain a code field (either via params.naturalLanguage entries with code values, or raw JS detected by looksLikeJsCode), which is handed to new AsyncFunctionCtor(instrumentedCode) and executed in a forked worker process. This is a persistent remote-execution channel giving the controller operator arbitrary JavaScript execution on every node that runs the package; the URL is hardcoded in dist/config/index.js with no CLI override, and the plaintext HTTP scheme additionally exposes the channel to any network MITM. Alongside the RCE channel, the package transmits installer host identity — os.hostname(), a non-internal IPv4 address from os.networkInterfaces(), nodeType/version/region/tags — to http://nethp-test.jd.com/rest/execution-nodes/register at startup and heartbeats every 30s. The package also ships a live third-party API key (pk-485b2b56-...) for https://modelservice.jdcloud.com/v1 as the default config.ai.apiKey in dist/config/index.js and in dist/.env, injected into process.env.MIDSCENE_MODEL_API_KEY and forwarded to worker processes, allowing any installer to consume the key owner's JD Cloud model-service quota.