취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (72b60bff5e0e18ecdc993dc505651612acba538fd6c5e46c4ea69619c453f8f9)

On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js invokes scripts/ensure-bun.sh, which runs curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash with no version pin and no hash/signature verification. The bin shim (bin/prjct) subsequently prefers the freshly installed bun over node and uses it to execute the package's sibling dist/bin/prjct.mjs. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: arbitrary bytes served by the upstream URL at install time become a runtime that then executes package code, bypassing Node-aware tooling and any pinned-version assumptions. Whatever bun.sh serves at the moment of install is granted execution on the installer's machine. Even though the destination is the genuine Bun publisher, the unpinned curl|bash pattern means the installer has no way to verify what bytes are executed; a future compromise of bun.sh, a TLS interception, or a mutable installer script change all silently ship arbitrary code into the install. The bin shim additionally mutates $HOME (writing into ~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.prjct-cli, creating symlinks in $HOME) on every invocation — content is package-owned and matches the advertised AI-agent integration purpose, but it is aggressive install practice worth flagging.