취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (1d078bac337fe2c1b76c757c29d286fc750be585db65f30f5d696038c2ea0d3a)

On require(), index.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/PC5CK and passes the response's cookie field to new Function('require',...), immediately invoking it with the host's require. This gives whoever controls that jsonkeeper.com paste full Node.js execution privileges on the installer's machine the moment any consumer imports the package. A second staged loader is wired in parallel: index.js top-level spawns a detached, stdio-ignored Node child running lib/caller.js, which polls a URL built from config values and, on a 404 response, passes error.response.data.token to Function.constructor and executes it with require. lib/const.js additionally stores a base64 string under DEV_API_KEY that decodes to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK — a second anonymous paste-host URL hidden from plain-string scanning. The package name presents as a chai plugin but the README describes an unrelated package (chai-submission), and declared dependencies (axios, request, sqlite3) are unrelated to chai assertions — an impersonation lure wrapping two import-time remote-eval channels.