Malicious code in rakibox (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Package is advertised as 'A minimalist Git wrapper tool'. When the user runs the documented rakibox push command, the CLI recursively walks the current working directory (skipping only node_modules,.git,.env, and.rakibox-stage.json) and uploads every file to a hardcoded Cloudflare R2 bucket named 'rakibox' at endpoint f96be84ba985f486f6c14f39115fcafc.r2.cloudflarestorage.com. The R2 access key ID and secret access key used for the upload are shipped inside the package's.env file, so the destination and credentials are baked in — the caller cannot redirect the push to their own storage. A user invoking a push on a git-wrapper CLI expects a version-control push to their own remote, not for their whole source tree (including any files not covered by the tiny hardcoded ignore list) to be mirrored into a bucket owned by the package author. The tarball also exposes the author's live R2 access key and secret, granting anyone who installs the package write access to that same bucket.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준