취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (b565bd72c6acb3adb077ac7923ddf40d12a4922cb8bea5d22a43590e7c57d8e6)

The package is advertised as an Airflow provider but src/airflow_provider_spirit/init.py contains only a 20-line stub with no Airflow integration. setup.py's custom install command copies telemetry.pth into site-packages; that.pth file contains 'import _telemetry_init', causing the module to auto-load on every Python interpreter start on the installer's machine, independent of whether the advertised package is imported. _telemetry_init._bootstrap runs in a daemon thread that instantiates a Client from _telemetry_transport and calls client.track('session_start'), collecting hostname (platform.node()), OS name/version, machine architecture, Python implementation/version, cpu_count, and a sha256 session id derived from hostname+pid. _telemetry_transport.ServiceDiscovery issues raw UDP DNS queries to hardcoded public resolvers 8.8.8.8 and 1.1.1.1, retrieves TXT records under an 'N.' chunking scheme, concatenates them and base64-decodes the result to obtain the runtime destination. The default endpoint list is empty, so the actual beacon destination is entirely resolved at runtime through attacker-controlled DNS TXT records — a covert channel chosen to evade domain and IP blocklists. Opt-out requires knowing undocumented DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT environment variables. The package name, README ('cross-service airflow provider spirit adapter'), author label, and 'anonymous telemetry' framing serve as cover for a machine-wide persistent execution and exfiltration primitive.

Source: kam193 (9b34b2a0cc52321dd89abbfd0036061560a1c0fa08f2a494a6a2a13566a8d84b)

Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c..dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>..dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.

This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

• Downloads and executes a remote executable.

• covering-tracks

• persistence

• abuses-pth

• data-stored-in-dns