취약점

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (0f5056dda18e9a9f440db7379d09fa1f9f7ff087ac00d6684170cddd40c240e9)

On npm install, postinstall.js collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), and process.version and transmits them over plain HTTP to 716bw4e4k31qif2nc1v658fb62ct0soh.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction subdomain), with DNS resolution providing a second exfil channel via subdomain encoding. The package itself is a near-empty shell — index.js exports only a ConsentsStatus enum — and is published at version 99.0.1, far above any plausible legitimate release for the @pluxee-connect scope. The structural shape (high-bumped version + trivial functional surface + lifecycle-time OOB beacon to oastify.com) is the canonical dependency-confusion attack against an internal scope. Any developer or CI system that resolves @pluxee-connect/api-client from public npm will leak machine identifiers to the attacker.