취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (59a8a8ab722d33bdd2ea25422aaf7e607a1b1a881446c3561ec8225fb9187742)

On require()/import of jsontoken-extend, sign.js executes a top-level IIFE that base64-decodes a hardcoded string to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/XAMRK, fetches the JSON body, and passes data.content directly to eval(). jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste service — the author can change the executed payload at any time without republishing the package, giving arbitrary remote code execution on every consumer at import time. A second base64-encoded URL (https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/W80UP) is staged but commented out, indicating multiple prepared payloads. The package name and public API (sign/verify/decode plus JsonWebTokenError/NotBeforeError/TokenExpiredError) mirror the popular jsonwebtoken library exactly, and it even declares jsonwebtoken as a dependency to pass through legitimate-looking calls — a typosquat lure to attract developers searching for the real JWT library. Base64-wrapping the C2 URLs is a deliberate static-analysis evasion. Three independent block signals are present: import-time fetch+eval from an anonymous mutable host, typosquat naming/API mirroring with malicious payload, and obfuscated C2 URL constants.