Malicious code in solana-key-utils (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On require(), index.js waits 37 seconds, reads test/fixtures/keypairs.dat (a 53KB base64 blob disguised as a test fixture, no test harness references it), base64-decodes it to ~39KB of opaque JavaScript, writes the result to ~/.cache-db/.node-sync/syncd.js with mode 0700, and spawns 'node syncd.js' detached with stdio ignored. The package then installs scheduled persistence on all three major platforms: a crontab entry running the dropped script every 12 hours on Linux, a scheduled task named 'WinNodeSync' on Windows via schtasks, and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.syncd.plist on macOS with RunAtLoad and StartInterval 43200. The dropped payload then re-executes every 12 hours independent of the original require, giving whoever published the package persistent code execution on the installer's machine. The 'solana-key-utils' name and 'test fixture' framing are cover for the smuggled executable payload.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준