In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not called. Subsequ
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not called. Subsequently, ac->ops->handle_reply() is called, which leads to a null pointer dereference, because ac->ops is still NULL.
This patch changes the check for ac->protocol != protocol to !ac->protocol, as this also includes the case when the protocol was set to zero in the message. This causes the message to be treated as containing a bad auth protocol.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 75.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 75.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준