ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. Prior to version 5.0.10, each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The signed payload contains only the canonical row content, with no version counter or freshness binding. An attacker who can write `store.db` and the matching `data_signatures` row — feasible duri
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. Prior to version 5.0.10, each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the data_signatures table. The signed payload contains only the canonical row content, with no version counter or freshness binding. An attacker who can write store.db and the matching data_signatures row — feasible during the opfilter-update window when the Endpoint Security filter is offline, or via offline-boot / decrypted-backup scenarios — can substitute a previously-captured legitimately-signed snapshot. opfilter accepts the older snapshot as fully valid on next boot because the existing signatures still verify. Version 5.0.10 patches the issue.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 69.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 69.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준