nebula-mesh: Host advanced overrides allow YAML injection into agent config.yml
internal/configgen/generator.go:86,108,119 interpolates the operator-supplied ListenHost and TunDevice fields raw into a text/template that produces the agent's config.yml. internal/web/advanced.go:20-35 accepts both with only strings.TrimSpace — no character or shape validation.
An operator (or attacker with any operator key, given the cross-tenant CRUD advisory) sets adv_tun_device to:
nebula0
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: true
hosts: ["10.0.0.1"]
#
The agent fetches the rendered config on its next signed poll. On config reload, it loads the injected YAML keys: the host self-promotes to lighthouse, attracts mesh traffic, or sets am_relay: true to be selected as a relay. The ListenHost field has the same shape.
All released versions prior to v0.3.2.
Two options, either acceptable:
Input validation in parseAdvancedFromForm (internal/web/advanced.go):
ListenHost: regex ^[A-Za-z0-9.:\[\]_-]+$ (IPv4/IPv6/hostname)TunDevice: regex ^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,15}$ (Linux IFNAMSIZ caps at 15)
Reject invalid input with a form-level error; do not write to the host row.Safer marshalling: switch configgen/generator.go to marshal a typed Go struct via gopkg.in/yaml.v3 (which escapes correctly) instead of text/template string-concat. Larger change, but eliminates this entire injection class.
Option 2 is preferable long-term. Option 1 is the quick fix.
The unsafe_routes advanced field is already netip.Parse{Prefix,Addr}-validated at enroll.go:226-233 — apply the same validation discipline to the other advanced fields.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(심각도 등급 추정치) | 80.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 80.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준