In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kexec: Push kjump return address even for non-kjump kexec The version of purgatory code shipped by kexec-tools attempts to look above the top of its stack to find a return address for a kjump, even in a non-kjump kexec. After the commit in Fixes: the word above the stack might not be there, leading to a fault (which is at least now caught by my exception-handling code in kexec). That commit fixed things for the actual kj
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: Push kjump return address even for non-kjump kexec
The version of purgatory code shipped by kexec-tools attempts to look above the top of its stack to find a return address for a kjump, even in a non-kjump kexec.
After the commit in Fixes: the word above the stack might not be there, leading to a fault (which is at least now caught by my exception-handling code in kexec).
That commit fixed things for the actual kjump path, but no longer "gratuitously" pushes the unused return address to the stack in the non-kjump path. Put that back in the non-kjump path, to prevent purgatory from crashing when trying to access it.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준