In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve() [Why & How] dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as "capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on subsequent vector appends. Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an inter
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()
[Why & How] dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as "capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on subsequent vector appends.
Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue.
(cherry picked from commit 37668568641ccc4cc1dbca4923d0a16609dd5707)
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 70.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 70.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준