AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access. The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification aft
AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.
The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도 | 51.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 51.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준