취약점

Part of a coordinated multi-package supply-chain attack impersonating EMCD (emcd.io), a legitimate Russian cryptocurrency exchange and mining pool. The attacker registered the @emcd-vue npm scope to distribute multiple malicious packages posing as internal tooling under the "EMCD Platform Engineering" identity. This package was published on the same day as confirmed campaign packages @emcd-vue/auth and @emcd-vue/loans, which share C2 infrastructure at oob.moika.tech.

The package description ("Internal HTTP client with retry, auth injection and request tracing") is fabricated; the @emcd-vue scope has no affiliation with the real EMCD exchange (emcd.io). Campaign packages in this scope use a multi-stage postinstall dropper that downloads and executes a platform-specific payload from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{platform} using a shared secret key, writes the payload to a hidden dot-file in the user's home directory, and beacons installation metadata to https://oob.moika.tech/report.

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Source: amazon-inspector (e45e677cee670117b0ff7dcdf2f04491cfb61385025a178e197ea35924e9410e)

@emcd-vue/b2b-pay-form ships an obfuscator.io-encoded scripts/postinstall.js wired as the npm postinstall lifecycle hook. On npm install, the script builds a platform-keyed URL from os.platform(), performs an HTTPS GET of a remote payload, writes it to os.tmpdir(), and spawns it via spawn(process.execPath, [tmpFile], {detached:true}).unref() — a classic install-time dropper that grants the publisher arbitrary remote code execution on every installing host. An environment-variable kill switch and a TTL-gated JSON cache in the user home directory throttle re-execution to evade detection. The package's stated purpose is an 'Internal HTTP client'; fetching and executing remote Node code is unrelated to that purpose. The package metadata is also fabricated dependency-confusion bait: scope @emcd-vue and all referenced domains (emcd-vue.io, github.emcd-vue.io, jira.emcd-vue.io, docs.emcd-vue.io, npm.emcd-vue.io, telemetry.emcd-vue.io) are not owned by any public organization, and the README instructs consumers to point npm at https://npm.emcd-vue.io while branding the package as 'Internal package — Platform Engineering Team' — the canonical pattern for targeting orgs whose private internal scope matches @emcd-vue or whose CI lazily resolves unknown scopes from the public registry. The postinstall file itself is heavily obfuscated (string-array + RC4-style decoder, control-flow flattening, self-defending function, 109-entry encoded string table), which has no legitimate purpose for a lifecycle script and is consistent with evasion of review.