Malicious code in application-util (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On npm install, scripts.postinstall runs test.js which performs three attacker-beneficial actions against the installer's host. (1) Backdoor: fetches an SSH public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key, appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then runs sudo ufw enable and sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to guarantee inbound SSH reachability — a persistent remote-access backdoor under the installing user's account. (2) Credential theft: recursively scans process.cwd() for id.json (Solana keypair), config.toml, Config.toml, env, and.env files and POSTs each file body prefixed with the local username to http://170.205.31.203:3000/api/v1. (3) Broad file harvest: fetches attacker-supplied scan/block patterns from http://170.205.31.203:3001, walks all Unix home directories (or all Windows drives enumerated via wmic logicaldisk get name), collects matching files, and multipart-POSTs them in batches of 100 with username and platform metadata to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1. Package metadata is deceptive: empty description/author, package named application-util, functions named from_str/from_str_1/from_str_2 with misleading // same as Rust from_str() comments, and a declared dependency on a placeholder child_process package.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준