Malicious code in set-proto-chain (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
lib/index.js contains a base64-encoded URL (decoding to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/BN77K, an anonymous mutable paste host) that is fetched via axios.get; the response's .data.cookie field is then written to the stdin of a detached node child process for execution. The top-level index.js calls getThetaInterface() unconditionally, and package.json declares postinstall: node index.js, so the fetch-and-execute path fires automatically on npm install as well as on require(). The fetched payload is attacker-controlled and can change at any time. The package additionally impersonates the legitimate proto-chain package (README header # proto-chain, runtime error messages referencing require('proto-chain')), making accidental installs more likely.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준