Malicious code in pdf-lib-enhanced (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Package name pdf-lib-enhanced mimics the widely-used pdf-lib library and ships a verbatim copy of upstream's README. package.json declares repository.url pointing at a fresh GitHub account (harunosakura030303-maker/pdf-lib-enhanced) while bugs.url still points at the original Hopding/pdf-lib project — a metadata mismatch consistent with a hastily-forked squat. The dist/ directory contains unrelated SheetJS assets (xlsx.full.min.js, xlsx.zahl.js, cpexcel.js, etc.) that have no purpose in a PDF library. However, the CommonJS main entry (cjs/index.js) re-exports the upstream pdf-lib API without any credential reads, exfiltration, dropper, or silent-relay behavior, and package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare lifecycle scripts, so installing the package does not auto-execute any code. The dormant SheetJS bundles are not referenced from the main entry. Name-similarity to a top-tier package combined with an irrelevant payload bundle warrants human assessment of intent, but there is no concrete installer-harm mechanism observable in the shipped code.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준