Malicious code in cookie-sign (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
The package presents itself as a cookie-signing / Express-middleware utility mimicking pino logger internals as cover, but its main entry spawns a detached child process running lib/initializeCaller.js. That script base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df), POSTs the caller's entire process.env to it, and passes the HTTP response body to new Function('require', response.data) for immediate execution. This yields two attacker gains against the installer: exfiltration of all environment variables (which in CI/production typically hold cloud credentials, tokens, and secrets) and remote code execution in the installer's Node process using code returned by the attacker-controlled server. The C2 URL is base64-obfuscated and stored under a decoy DEV_API_KEY field, and the package name misrepresents its purpose.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준